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Abstract
We propose a parametric family of measures of fairness in alloca-
tions of TU-cooperative games. Their definition is based on general-
ized Re´nyi Entropy, is related to the Cowell-Kuga generalized entropy
indices in welfare economics, and aims to parallel the spirit of the no-
tion of price of anarchy in the case of convex TU-cooperative games.
Since computing these indices is NP-complete in general, we first
upper bound the performance of a “reverse greedy” algorithm for ap-
proximately computing worst-case fairness. The result provides a gen-
eral additive error guarantee in terms of two (problem dependent)
packing constants. We then particularize this result to the class of
induced subset games. For such games computing worst-case fairness
is NP-complete, and the additive guarantee constant can be explicitly
computed. We compare this result to the performance of an alternate
algorithm based on “biased orientations”.
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1 Introduction
A central issue in cooperative game theory is coming up with a ”fair” allo-
cation of a total cost to a set of agents that respects coalitional rationality.
The Shapley value [Rot88] provides the classical, well-understood approach
to this problem. But it is not the only possible solution, nor is it appropri-
ate from all points of view. Indeed, computing the Shapley value is often
intractable [DP94]. Imposing the Shapley value in a distributed multiagent
setting (though possible in principle) may be even more problematic, as it
requires the use of a (centralized) mechanism that incentivizes the players
to commit to accepting this cost-sharing method. Furthermore, there are
settings where using the Shapley value may simply be inappropriate. This
is, for instance, the case of coalitions with a dynamically evolving structure,
or that of games in which the Shapley value is not in the core (hence it
is not immune against coalitional deviations). Finally, the Shapley value
may be incompatible with the presence of prior social constraints that favor
alternative social arrangements (e.g. egalitarianism [DR89]).
We do not mean by the previous discussion that one could replace the
Shapley value by any alternative allocation in the core: it simply may be the
case that no single solution concept is appropriate in all circumstances.
In noncooperative game theory the seminal work of Roughgarden and
Tardos [RT02, Rou05, RT07] on the price of anarchy provides a powerful
intuition that could have an analog in cooperative settings as well. Instead
of advocating any particular solution to the problem of equilibrium selection,
their price of anarchy measure takes a pessimistic perspective, quantifying
the degradation in overall performance due to uncoordinated behavior, mea-
sured on the worst equilibrium. This circumvents the problem of equilibrium
selection by providing (pessimistic) guarantees that are valid for any rational
solution.
In this paper we propose an approach with a similar philosophy for coop-
erative games. Rather than attempting to postulate any particular solution
of such a game, we investigate the fairness of an arbitrary “rational” cost
allocation (where in this paper we define rationality as membership in the
core). We propose not a single measure, but a parametric family of measures
of fairness, based on variations on the concept of Re´nyi entropy and fruitfully
used before as measures of inequality in welfare economics [CK81].
The structure of the paper is as follows: in Section 2 we briefly review
some relevant concepts in cooperative game theory, information theory and
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combinatorial optimization. We then introduce in Section 3 our paramet-
ric family of measures of fairness. In Section 4 we first present a “reverse
greedy” algorithm for the problem of minimizing the worst-case fairness of
a convex cooperative game. We give a general result on the performance of
this algorithm. In section 5 we particularize our discussion to the class of
induced subgraph games of Deng and Papadimitriou [DP94]: first we apply
the general result in the previous section to obtain an explicit bound on the
performance of the reverse greedy algorithm. Then we display a connection
with a weighted version of the minimum entropy orientation problem from
[CFJ08b] that allows us to obtain a bound that is better for some particular
values of the parameter λ.
2 Preliminaries
We will work in the framework of Cooperative Game Theory (for a recent
survey of the relevant literature from a Computer Science perspective see
[CEW11]). We will assume knowledge of basic concepts from this literature
such as cooperative game, core, concavity/convexity of a cooperative game,
imputation, Shapley value and so on.
We need the following notion adapted from [AKV08]:
Definition 1. A solution concept q is a function that assigns to every convex
cooperative game Γ an imputation q = q(Γ). It is a core concept if q(Γ) ∈
core(Γ) for every such game Γ.
We will also assume knowledge of computational complexity. A standard
recent reference is [AB09].
We recall the notion of Re´nyi entropy of a probability distribution:
Definition 2. [CT91] For any discrete random variable X with probability
mass function p = (pi)i and for any real λ > 0, λ 6= 1 the Re´nyi entropy of
order λ of X is defined as:
Hλ(X) =
1
1− λ
log2
(∑
i
pλi
)
. (1)
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We can complete this definition for λ = 1 by the usual Shannon entropy
H(X) = H1(X) = −
∑
i
pi log2 pi. (2)
Without loss of generality we will assume in the sequel that one can
convert any vector of nonnegative values X into a probability distribution
by normalization. Without risk of confusion we will use the name X for the
resulting distribution as well.
We need the following simple fact, which informally states that stochastic
domination leads to lower Re´nyi entropy:
Lemma 1. Let P = (p1, . . . , pi, . . . , pj, . . . , pn) be a probability distribution
with p1 ≥ p2 ≥ · · · ≥ pn. Let 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n and 0 < ǫ ≤ pj. Defining
Q = (p1, . . . , pi + ǫ, . . . , pj − ǫ, . . . , pn) for any λ > 0 we have:
Hλ(P ) > Hλ(Q). (3)
When λ = 1 the result was proved in [AO95] (see also [CFJ08b]). The
general case follows from investigating (using standard calculus techniques)
the monotonicity of function f(x) = (x+ ǫ)λ − xλ for x > 0.
We will highlight the concepts we introduce in this paper on the class of
induced subgraph games, studied in [DP94] (see also [CEW11, Top98]).
Definition 3. [Induced subgraph (IS) games:] We are given a connected
loopless graph G = (V,E) and a set of integer weights (wi,j)(i,j)∈E on the
edges. Vertices of G are interpreted as players in a cooperative game, that
may contribute to a coalition the edges they have in common with members
of their coalition. In other words, given set S ⊆ V , the value of coalition S
is
v(S) =
∑
(i,j)∈E,i,j∈S
wi,j. (4)
In [DP94] it is proved that for nonnegative weights induced subgraph
games are convex. In what follows we will assume that weights are nonneg-
ative. In addition we also assume that, for any vertex v ∈ V, the sum of
weights of its adjacent edges is strictly positive. Otherwise we could simply
eliminate v from G without changing the problem.
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Definition 4. Given an instance (G,w) of IS, a cover of (G,w) is a function
u : V → Z+ such that u(V ) = v(V ) and for all S ⊆ V ,
u(S) :
def
=
∑
i∈S
u(i) ≤ v(S).
That is, a cover is an imputation in the core of the cooperative game (V, v)
having integer values. The restriction to integers is computationally moti-
vated, and reasonable in any intended algorithmic application of cooperative
game theory.
To apply our result to IS games we need a problem generalizing the min-
imum entropy orientation problem from [CFJ08b]:
Definition 5. Consider a connected loopless graph G = (V,E) and a set of
integer weights (wi,j)(i,j)∈E.
• An orientation of G is a mapping h : E → V such that for any e =
(i, j) ∈ E, h(e) is a vertex of e. If h(e) = i we will say that e is oriented
towards i in h.
• an orientation h of G is called biased if each edge (i, j) ∈ E with
v(i) > v(j) is oriented toward i, where the value v(i) :=
∑
e∼i we is the
weight sum of all edges adjacent to vertex i. In other words, edges are
oriented towards the vertex whose weight sum is larger.
An optimization problem associated to edge orientations is to find an
orientation h of G that minimizes Re´nyi entropy of the weights vector:
Hλ[h] =
1
1− λ
log

∑
i∈V
(∑
e∈h−1(i) we∑
e∈E we
)λ
(and similarly for λ = 1). We will denote this problem by MREWO.
One can find an approximately solution to any instance of this problem
by means of the Greedy algorithm (formally discussed in the unweighted case
in [CFJ08b, CD08]), described informally as follows:
• Select a vertex i ∈ V that maximizes value v(i).
• Orient all edges in G towards i.
• Delete i and all its adjacent edges from G and proceed recursively.
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3 The (parametric) worst-case fairness of a
cooperative game
We now define the main object of interest, a parametric family of measures
of fairness for cost allocations of a cooperative game Γ = (N, v). They are
indexed by:
• A positive real λ.
• A solution concept q, yielding vector q(Γ) ∈ R
|N |
+ . Intuitively vector
q(Γ) represents a baseline ”standard of fairness” to which all other ele-
ments are held. Our measures attempt to evaluate the largest possible
discrepancy between an imputation in the core and q(Γ).
To define our measure we need the following concepts:
Definition 6. Let P = (pi) and Q = (qi) be two distributions and λ > 0.
1. The Re´nyi divergence of order λ is defined by:
Dλ(P ‖ Q) =
1
λ− 1
log
(∑
i
pλi q
1−λ
i
)
2. The discrete Re´nyi relative entropy of order λ is:
hλ[P,Q] =
1
1− λ
log
(∑
i
qλ−1i pi
)
+
1
λ
log
(∑
i
qλi
)
−
1
λ(1− λ)
log
(∑
i
pλi
)
(5)
The following is the discrete version of the Gibbs inequality (Lemma 1
from [LYZ05]):
Lemma 2. For any λ > 0 the discrete λ-Re´nyi relative entropy has a non-
negative value.
hλ[P,Q] ≥ 0.
6
For the proof see the Appendix.
Though they do not generally yield metrics, informational divergence
measures have a significant history of use as indicators of ”similarity” between
two probability distributions. They are pseudometrics and have a number of
other desirable properties that have made them applicable to problems such
as learning and classification (to give just one example we refer to [Ull96]).
This observation enables us to finally give the following definition of worst-
case fairness:
Definition 7. Given cooperative game Γ = (N, v) and real number λ > 0 the
λ-worst-case fairness of game Γ with respect to solution concept q is defined
as
Fairλ(Γ, q) = sup{Dλ(x||q(Γ)) : x ∈ core(Γ) ∩ Z
N}.
Definition 7 obviously depends on the choice of the baseline solution con-
cept q. At least several special cases make sense:
1. strictly egalitarian worst-case fairness: q(Γ) is the uniform vector
U(i) = v(N)
|N |
for all i ∈ N. That is, we benchmark all solutions against
the uniform distribution.
Though it could seem at first somewhat controversial from a modeling
standpoint, as it requires a very strong form of equality, the study of this
measure makes sense at least from a mechanism design point of view.
Namely, in the case of convex/concave games, particularly interest-
ing examples of imputations in the core arise from group-strategyproof
mechanisms or, equivalently, cross-monotonic sharing schemes (see [Mou99]
and Chapter 15 of [NRTV07]). Requiring cross-monotonicity yields
(according to [IMM08]) a “plausible notion of equity”. A natural is-
sue raised by this scenario is the potential inequity in cost assignments
induced by the use of cross-monotonic mechanisms. The strictly egali-
tarian worst-case fairness offers a pessimistic measure of this inequity.
The study of strictly egalitarian worst-case fairness can be further justi-
fied on technical grounds: the computational tractability of the uniform
distribution makes the derivation of algorithmic bounds on worst-case
fairness easier than the general case. Furthermore, as we will see, we
can derive weaker bounds for some alternate core concepts from bounds
on strictly egalitarian worst-case fairness.
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2
4 6 core(G) :


x+ y + z = 12
x+ y ≥ 2
x+ z ≥ 4
y + z ≥ 6
x, y, z ≥ 0.
Figure 1: (a) An IS game with three players; (b) Its core.
2. marginalist worst-case fairness: in this case q is the probability distri-
bution obtained from the Shapley value by normalization. One should,
of course, not expect this measure to be efficiently computable given
that the Shapley index is hard to compute.
3. egalitarian worst-case fairness: in this case q corresponds to the egali-
tarian solution of Dutta and Ray [DR89]. Alternately one could use the
equivalent Arin and In˜arra solution concept [AIn01] that is a core con-
cept for convex games. We will not study this measure in the present
paper.
Example 1. Consider the induced subgraph game Γ with three players
presented in Figure 1(a). The total payoff to be shared between players
is 12 = 2 + 4 + 6. The core of Γ is given by the system of equations in
Figure 1(b).
The Shapley value is (according to the computation in [DP94]) Sh =
(3; 4; 5). Furthermore, by performing simple symbolic computations one can
show the following:
• There are a total of 57 integer imputations (covers) in the core. Of these
six are extremal (i.e. corners of the polygon geometrically describing
the core).
• There are two covers in the core maximizing strictly egalitarian worst-
case fairness (for λ = 1). They are (2; 0; 10) and (0; 2; 10) respectively.
Worst-case fairness Fair1(Γ, U) is approximately 0.934.
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• On the other hand there exists an unique optimal cover in the case
of marginalist worst-case fairness : X = (4; 8; 0). The corresponding
worst-case fairness Fair1(Γ, Sh) is approximately 0.805.
Thus employing the Shapley value as our standard of fairness of general
cost allocations in the core is, at least in this game, more fair than imposing
perfect equality.
3.1 Further comments
We have limited our choices to imputations with integer values. Though
certainly non-standard (and potentially controversial from a “pure” game-
theoretic perspective), we feel that such a restriction is warranted in any
algorithmic result on computational game theory. Indeed, “real-life” mon-
etary payments are not continuous but discrete. We believe that it is not
unnatural to impose such a restriction on imputations in a paper dealing
with algorithmic aspects.
The problem of computing the strictly egalitarian worst-case fairness has
an especially tractable interpretation. In this case maximizing Re´nyi diver-
gence is equivalent to the problem of minimizing Re´nyi entropy. A more
limited connection between divergence and entropy holds even in the general
case. Given distribution R = (ri), denote rmax = max{rj : j ∈ supp(R)},
rmin = min{rj : j ∈ supp(R)} and define
nu(R) = log
(
rmax
rmin
)
, (6)
the nonuniformity of distribution R.
Lemma 3. Let P,Q,R be probability distributions and λ > 0. We have:
Hλ(Q)−Hλ(P )−nu(R) ≤ Dλ(P ||R)−Dλ(Q||R) ≤ Hλ(Q)−Hλ(P )+nu(R)
Proof. See Appendix.
Computing a cover x of a cooperative game Γ = (N, v) that witnesses
the value of the λ-worst-case fairness Fairλ(Γ, q) has, when q is the uniform
distribution an alternative combinatorial description relying on concepts of
submodular optimization [GLS93]. In this setting a convex cooperative game
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Γ = (N, v) maps to an instance of the supermodular Set Cover problem.
The more frequent problem, that of submodular set cover [Wol82, Fuj00]
corresponds to the dual of the cooperative game Γ, that is to the game
Γ∗ = (N, v∗), with v∗(S) = v(N) − v(N \ S). As games Γ and Γ∗ have the
same core, the measure Fairλ can be computed with respect to the convex
game Γ∗ instead of Γ.
Finding a cover realizing optimal value Fairλ(Γ, U) is a natural general-
ization of a extension (studied in [CD08]) of the minimum entropy set cover
problem [HK05, CFJ08a]. This problem specializes to induced subgraph
games as follows:
Definition 8. [Minimum Re´nyi Entropy IS] (MREIS):
[GIVEN:] An instance (G,w) of IS, and a real number λ ∈ R+, λ 6= 1.
[TO FIND:] A cover u of (G,w) that minimizes :
Hλ(u) =
1
1− λ
log
[∑
i∈V
(
u(i)
u(V )
)λ]
.
Replacing Hλ by Shannon entropy H1 in the above definition we get the
minimum entropy induced subset problem.
Another version of MREIS involves fractional covers. We no longer in-
sist on the integrality condition in Definition 4. Instead we allow imputations
to be real-valued. Clearly, this results in a larger solution set.
4 Results
Many results related to submodular optimization analyze the performance
of the GREEDY algorithm. For supermodular (convex) games, this doesn’t
quite make sense: assigning the first element i its payoff v({i}) does not
take into account the fact that the contribution of player i increases with the
coalition, being largest for the coalition N \ {i}. In other words v({i}) ≤
v(N)− v(N \ {i}), and, to create an imbalanced allocation we should assign
player i its utopia payoff (that is the right-hand quantity, rather than the
left-hand). This leads to considering the ReverseGreedy algorithm displayed
below.
Example 2. Consider the setting of Example 1. The ReverseGreedy algo-
rithm computes one of the covers (0; 2; 10) or (2; 0; 10) (optimal in the case
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ReverseGreedy:
INPUT : A game Γ = (N, f)
y := 0;
A := N ;
While there exists e ∈ A with f(A)− f(A \ {e}) > 0
choose ir ∈ A that maximizes f(A)− f(A \ {ir})
(breaking ties arbitrarily);
yir := f(A)− f(A \ {ir});
A := A \ {ir};
OUTPUT : Solution Y = (yi)i∈N .
Figure 2: The ReverseGreedy algorithm
of egalitarian worst-case fairness). The computed cover depends on the tie-
breaking rule between the first two nodes. Indeed, the algorithm first selects
node C, allocating its utopia value 4 + 6 = 10. Then it selects one of A and
B in an arbitrary order.
The ReverseGreedy algorithm has an especially attractive interpretation
via game duality : ReverseGreeedy on game Γ simply corresponds by duality
to the Greedy algorithm applied on the dual game Γ∗.
4.1 Main result
In this section we give our main result, a bound on the performance of the
ReverseGreedy algorithm in approximating the strictly egalitarian worst-case
fairness. That is we consider the case when q = U , the uniform distribution.
To do so we have to introduce some notation. Specifically:
1. We will denote by l the number of iterations of the ReverseGreedy
algorithm.
2. For 1 ≤ r ≤ l denote by ir the element chosen at stage r of the
algorithm. Let Wr = {i1, . . . , ir}, Ar = U \Wr and ∆r be the value of
element yir set at stage r.
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We now introduce a quantity, the ”impact of j on ir”, that will play a
fundamental role in our results below:
Definition 9. For any 1 ≤ r ≤ l we define the impact of j on ir by
ajr = [f(Ar−1)− f(Ar)]− [f(Ar−1 \ {j})− f(Ar \ {j})] . (7)
Proposition 1. For any 1 ≤ r ≤ l and 1 ≤ j ≤ m we have ajr ≥ 0.
Proof. Note that Ar−1 = Ar ∪ {ir}. Thus when j = ir or ir 6= j 6∈ Ar−1 the
second term is zero, and the result follows directly from the monotonicity of
function f . Assume now that ir 6= j ∈ Ar−1, thus j ∈ Ar. Define S = Ar
and T = Ar−1 \ {j}. Then S ∪ T = Ar−1, S ∩ T = Ar \ {j}, and we employ
the supermodularity of function f .
Given an optimal solution X = (Xj), we will break it down into a large
number of components Zjr ∈ Z as presented in equations (8) and (9) below:
Xj =
l∑
r=1
Zjr , ∀j ∈ [m] (8)
0 ≤ Zjr ≤ a
j
r. (9)
Intuitively Zjr is the part of the optimal solution Xj that can be assigned
to cover “set ir”. This explains the newly introduced constants: first, one
cannot allocate more than the total of Xj . Second, one cannot allocate to
any “set ir” more than “its intersection with Xj”.
Definition 10. Given concave game Γ
• Let α = α(Γ) the smallest positive value such that for some cover X
in the core minimizing Fairλ(Γ), one can define quantities Z
j
r so that
inequalities
m∑
j=1
Zjr ≤ α ·∆r (10)
hold for any 1 ≤ r ≤ l.
• Let β = β(Γ) the largest positive value such that for some cover X
in the core minimizing Fairλ(Γ), one can define quantities Z
j
r so that
inequalities
β ·∆r ≤
m∑
j=1
Zjr (11)
hold for any 1 ≤ r ≤ l.
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Proposition 2. For any convex game Γ we have
β(Γ) ≤ 1 ≤ α(Γ).
Proof. We prove the first inequality, the second is proved in an entirely similar
manner.
Sum all equations (11) for all r = 1, . . . , l:
The left-hand side is
β(Γ) ·
l∑
r=1
∆r = β(Γ) · f(N),
by the ReverseGreedy algorithm.
Similarly, the right-hand side is
l∑
r=1
(
m∑
j=1
Zjr
)
=
m∑
j=1
(
l∑
r=1
Zjr
)
=
m∑
j=1
Xj = f(N).
The result follows.
Our main result gives an upper bound applicable to all convex cooperative
games:
Theorem 1. Given a convex cooperative game Γ the ReverseGreedy algo-
rithm produces a cover RG satisfying
• For any 0 < λ < 1
Hλ(RG) ≤ Hλ(OPT ) +
1
λ− 1
log2(βλ). (12)
• For any λ > 1
Hλ(RG) ≤ Hλ(OPT ) +
1
λ− 1
log2(αλ). (13)
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Corollary 1. The cover RG produced by the ReverseGreedy algorithm satis-
fies
Dλ(RG ‖ U) ≥ Fairλ(Γ, U)− δλ(Γ) (14)
where δλ(Γ) =
{
1
λ−1
log2(βλ), if 0 < λ < 1
1
λ−1
log2(αλ), if λ > 1
Proof. Follows directly from Theorem 1 and Lemma 3.
Observation 1. By Proposition 2 both constants in the upper bounds of
Theorem 1 are nonnegative.
Observation 2. If at least one of parameters α or β are equal to 1 then we
can complete the result to the case λ = 1 by taking the limit λ→ 1, yielding
H(RG) ≤ H(OPT ) + log2(e). (15)
4.2 Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. Let OPT = (Xj)j∈[m] and RG = (yi)i∈[n].
For 1 ≤ r ≤ l we will use the shorthand U rj = Xj −
∑r
k=1Z
j
k. We also
define U0j = Xj. For any fixed j, sequence (U
r
j ) is decreasing with r. On the
other hand U r−1j − U
r
j = Z
j
r .
By the greedy choice we infer yir = ∆r = f(Ar−1) − f(Ar) for any 1 ≤
r ≤ l, with yi = 0 for other values of i.
We have A0 = N . Thus
∆r ≥ f(Ar−1)− f(Ar−1 \ {j}) =
= f(N)− [f(N)− f(Ar−1)]− f(N \ {j}) + [f(N \ {j})− f(Ar−1 \ {j})]
= f(N)−
r−1∑
k=1
[f(Ak−1)− f(Ak)]− f(N \ {j}) +
r−1∑
k=1
[f(Ak−1 \ {j})−
− f(Ak \ {j})] ≥ f(N)− f(N \ {j})−
r−1∑
k=1
ajk ≥ Xj −
r−1∑
k=1
ajk. (16)
At the last step we used inequality Xj ≤ f(N) − f(N \ {j}), which
follows from core membership (in)equalities
∑
k∈N\{j}Xk ≥ f(N \ {j}) and∑
k∈N Xk = f(N).
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Case λ > 1:
First we use inequality
∑m
j=1Z
j
r ≤ α ·∆r as follows:
α
l∑
r=1
(∆r)
λ =
l∑
r=1
(α∆r)(∆r)
λ−1 ≥
l∑
r=1
(
m∑
j=1
Zjr
)
(∆r)
λ−1
Applying inequality (16) we get:
l∑
r=1
m∑
j=1
Zjr∆
λ−1
r ≥
l∑
r=1
m∑
j=1
Zjr
(
Xj −
r−1∑
k=1
Zjk
)λ−1
=
m∑
j=1
[
l∑
r=1
Zjr(U
r−1
j )
λ−1
]
Using identity Zjr = U
r
j − U
r−1
j we have:
m∑
j=1
l∑
r=1
Zjr (U
r−1
j )
λ−1 =
m∑
j=1
l∑
r=1
(U rj − U
r−1
j )(U
r−1
j )
λ−1 = (∗)
Transforming the difference into a sum of ones and taking into account
that xλ−1 is increasing we obtain:
(∗) =
m∑
j=1

 l∑
r=1

 U
r−1
j∑
k=Urj+1
(U r−1j )
λ−1



 ≥ m∑
j=1

 l∑
r=1

 U
r−1
j∑
k=Urj+1
kλ−1




From U0j = Xj it follows that:
m∑
j=1

 l∑
r=1

 U
r−1
j∑
k=Urj+1
kλ−1



 = m∑
j=1

 Xj∑
k=1
kλ−1


Putting things together, using λ > 1 and standard calculus we have:
α
l∑
r=1
(∆r)
λ ≥
m∑
j=1

 Xj∑
k=1
kλ−1

 ≥ m∑
j=1
Xλj
λ
=
1
λ
m∑
j=1
Xλj
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Taking the logarithm and dividing by 1− λ < 0 yields:
1
1− λ
log
(
l∑
r=1
∆λr
)
≤
1
1− λ
log
(
m∑
j=1
Xλj
)
−
1
1− λ
log(αλ)
or, equivalently, by the definition of Re´nyi entropy:
Hλ(RG) ≤ Hλ(OPT ) +
1
λ− 1
log(αλ)
The proof is similar in the case 0 < λ < 1. We use instead the definition
of β. Also the standard calculus inequality changes its direction.
5 The worst-case fairness of Induced Subgraph
Games
In this section we particularize our general result on worst-case fairness to
the case of Induced Subgraph Games (problem MREIS). An easy first ob-
servation is that computing the worst-case fairness of this class of games is
computationally intractable:
Theorem 2. For any λ > 0 the following decision problems is NP-complete:
• Given an induced subgraph game Γ = (G,w) with nonnegative weights
and a constant η > 0, does Fairλ(Γ, U) ≥ η ? That is, is there any
cover x ∈ core(Γ) with Dλ(x, U) ≥ η ?
We believe that similar result is true for the marginalist worst-case fair-
ness as well. However, we weren’t able to prove it and leave it as an intriguing
open problem (see the final section for further comments).
Given Theorem 2 (proved in the Appendix) we need to consider approx-
imation algorithms. We next give explicit upper bounds on strictly egalitar-
ian and marginalist worst-case fairness for induced subgraph games. First
we prove a more explicit version of Corollary 1 for such games. We then
consider the target distribution Sh obtained from the Shapley value of an in-
duced subgraph game Γ (see Theorem 1 in [DP94]) by normalization. In this
case we compare the performance of the cover RG given by the ReverseG-
reedy algorithm to that of a cover BI corresponding to a biased orientation
(Definition 5).
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Theorem 3. Given an induced subgraph game Γ = (G,w) and λ > 0
1. The ReverseGreedy algorithm produces a cover RG satisfying
Hλ(Sh)−Hλ(OPT ) ≤ [Hλ(Sh)−Hλ(RG)] +
1
λ− 1
log2(λ). (17)
2. Consider any cover BI corresponding to a biased orientation of instance
(G,w) of MREWO. It satisfies:
Hλ(Sh)−Hλ(OPT ) ≤
1
λ
[Hλ(Sh)−Hλ(BI)] + 1. (18)
Corollary 2. In the setting of the previous result we have:
1. For strictly egalitarian worst-case fairness:
Dλ(RG ‖ U) ≥ Fairλ(Γ, U)−
1
λ− 1
log2(λ)
2. For marginalist worst-case fairness:
Dλ(RG ‖ Sh) ≥ Fairλ(Γ, Sh)−
1
λ− 1
log2(λ)− nu(Sh) (19)
and
Dλ(BI ‖ Sh) ≥ λ · Fairλ(Γ, Sh)− (1 + λ) · nu(Sh)− λ (20)
Proof. Follows directly from Theorem 3 and Lemma 3.
We note that for marginalist worst-case fairness the second bound may
be slightly better when λ ≈ 1 . Indeed, in the limit λ→ 1 term 1
λ−1
log2(λ)
tends to log2(e) ≈ 1.442 . . ., while λ ≈ 1. This shows that the best of the
two guarantees in equations (19) and (20) may depend on the precise value
of constant λ (and, of course, other features of the instance at hand).
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5.1 Proof of Theorem 3.1
The basis of our proof is the following result, that relates the problem of
computing a cover in an induced subgraph game to problem MREWO as
follows:
Lemma 4. Given an induced subgraph game Γ = (G,w) the following are
true:
1. The cover produced by the ReverseGreedy algorithm coincides with the
solution produced by the Greedy algorithm on Γ, seen as an instance of
problem MREWO.
2. The optimal fractional solution of Γ yields an optimal solution of in-
stance Γ of problem MREWO and conversely.
Proof. 1. Consider a fixed step i of the ReverseGreedy algorithm for prob-
lem Γ. At this step ReverseGreedy chooses a vertex vi such that its
choice maximizes the marginal decrease in coalition cost. That is, the
sum of weights of edges adjacent to vi and another node still in the
coalition is the largest.
Formally, at step i we delete vertex vi ∈ Vi−1 and obtain the graph
Gi = (Vi, Ei) with Vi = Vi−1 \ {vi} and Ei = E(Vi). The marginal
decrease to maximize is:
m(vi) =
∑
v∈Vi−1,v 6=vi
wvi,v.
(note that G0 = G.)
Similarly, given instance (G,w) of problem MREWO the Greedy algo-
rithm (discussed at the end of Section 2) chooses at step i a vertex vi
maximizing the sum of weights of all adjacent, not yet oriented, edges.
It orients all such edges towards vi. This step is thus formally identical
to the corresponding choice of ReverseGreedy on instance Γ of MREIS.
2. Fractional covers Z = (z1, z2, . . . , zn) of an IS game (imputations in the
core) can be characterized as follows:
zi =
∑
(i,j)∈E
ri,jw(i,j) (21)
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where ri,j are real numbers in the range 0 ≤ ri,j ≤ 1 with ri,j+ rj,i = 1.
This claim is an easy consequence of the characterization of the core
of IS games [DP94], and a special case of a more general paradigm
[DIN99].
Lemma 5. Let X = (xi)i be an optimal fractional cover of instance Γ.
Without loss of generality reorder the set of vertices so that x1 ≥ x2 ≥
· · · ≥ xn. Then coefficients ri,j from formula (21) satisfy:
ri,j =
{
1, if i < j
0, if i > j.
for all i, j ∈ V.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary edge (i, j) ∈ E. Assume that i < j (the
opposite case is easily handled via relation ri,j + rj,i = 1) and ri,j < 1.
Define for notational convenience 0 < ǫ < 1 by ǫ = rj,i = 1 − ri,j .
With this choice further define X˜ = (x˜1, . . . , x˜i, . . . , x˜j , . . . , x˜n) where
x˜i = xi + ǫwi,j, x˜j = xj − ǫwi,j, and x˜k = xk for all other k 6= i, j. Note
that x˜ and x differ just on components i, j. By the previous remark x˜
is still an imputation in the core.
We now apply Lemma 1 and infer that for all λ > 0 we have Hλ(X) >
Hλ(X˜), which contradicts the hypothesis that X had the lowest Re´nyi
entropy.
The previous result can be interpreted as follows: any optimal solution
X = (xi)i satisfies xi =
∑
(i,j)∈E,i<j w(i,j), where the elements of X are
listed in nonincreasing order.
With this result in hand, we construct a solution Y = (y1, . . . , yn)
of instance Γ of MREWO by orienting all the edges (i, j) with i < j
towards the vertex with a lower index. Y arises from an edge orientation
u given by u((i, j)) = i for all i < j. Thus
yi =
∑
e∈u−1(i)
we =
∑
(i,j)∈E,i<j
w(i,j) = xi.
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Clearly, the objective values of X and Y are the same.
Conversely, let Y = (yi)i be an optimal cover of an instance Γ of
MREWO, with associated orientation u and yi =
∑
e∈u−1(i) we. We
assume that vertices are ordered to respect y1 ≥ y2 ≥ · · · ≥ yn, thus if
i < j we have u(i, j) = i.
From Y we can define a solution X of an instance Γ of MREIS as in
equation (21) with
ri,j =
{
1, (i, j) ∈ u−1(i)
0, otherwise.
Therefore
xi =
∑
(i,j)∈E
ri,jw(i,j) =
∑
(i,j)∈u−1(i)
w(i,j) = yi,
and solutions X and Y have again the same objective values.
Together these two facts show that optima of a common instance of
the two problems are the same, and the proof is complete.
To complete the proof of Theorem 3.1, by Theorem 1 all we need to prove
is the following
Lemma 6. For all IS games Γ = (G,w) one can construct a system of
parameters (Zjr) from Equation (8), witnessing equality α(Γ) = β(Γ) = 1.
Proof. The argument is a slight generalization of the analysis given in [BI12]
for the Minimum Entropy Orientation Problem [CFJ08b, CFJ12].
Lemma 7. Given any IS game (G,w) we have
ajr =


wir ,j, if ir 6= j, (ir, j) ∈ E, j ∈ Ar
∆r, if ir = j
0, otherwise,
(22)
where ∆r is the value computed by the algorithm ReverseGreedy at stage r.
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Proof. A simple application of formulas (4) and (7): in this case, for any set
S ⊆ V
f(S) := v(S) =
∑
e∈S×S
we.
Therefore f(Ar−1)− f(Ar) is the sum of weights we of edges e between ir
and another node in Ar. On the other hand the value of expression f(Ar−1 \
{j})− f(Ar \ {j}) depends on j:
• It is zero if ir = j,
• It is f(Ar−1)− f(Ar) when j 6= ir and j /∈ Ar,
• Otherwise, it is equal to the sum of weights we of edges e between ir and
another node in Ar \ {j}. In particular this is equal to f(Ar−1)− f(Ar)
when j is not adjacent to ir.
The result follows.
Lemma 7 allows us to define a system of coefficients (Zjr) satisfying for
every r : ∑
j
Zjr = ∆r. (23)
Together with the Definition (10) and Proposition (2) this will witness
the fact that α(Γ) = β(Γ) = 1.
In the construction we will see covers OPT and RG as edge orientations
in the weighted graph (G,w). We will use the names OPT and RG for these
orientations as well.
To enforce equation (23) we note that ∆r is the sum of weights of all edges
oriented towards ir in RG. Intuitively we will redistribute this amount among
coefficients Zjr with 1 ≤ j ≤ m. We do this by comparing orientations OPT
and RG. Edges are considered in the order given by the Greedy algorithm.
• Start with Zjr = 0 for all r and j.
• Run algorithm Greedy that constructs orientation RG, updating coef-
ficients during the algorithm:
• At each stage r: after choice of vertex ir we consider edges (ir, j)
oriented by Greedy towards ir. There are two possibilities:
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1. (ir, j) is oriented towards ir in both RG and OPT. We set Z
ir
r =
Z irr + wir ,j.
2. (ir, j) is oriented differently in OPT and RG. We let Z
j
r = wir ,j(=
ajr) for such edges.
Note that the total weight assigned at stage r is ∆r(= a
ir
r according to
Lemma 7).
Hence the inequality 0 ≤ Zjr ≤ a
j
r is true for j = ir as well.
This completes the proof of Theorem 3.1.
5.2 Proof of Theorem 3.2
Proof. Let
−→
G be an orientation of G = (V, E) of minimal Re´nyi entropy.
Denote by OPT = (qi)i the indegree distribution qi =
v−→
G
(i)
W
, where v−→
G
(i)
(as in Definition 5) is the sum of weights of all edges oriented in
−→
G towards
vertex i ∈ V, and W is the sum of all edge weights.
The Re´nyi entropy of OPT expands as follows:
Hλ(OPT ) =
1
1− λ
log2
(∑
i∈V
(qi)
λ
)
=
1
1− λ
log2
(∑
i∈V
[
v−→
G
(i)
W
]λ)
=
1
1− λ
log2
(∑
i∈V
v−→
G
(i)
W
[
v−→
G
(i)
W
]λ−1)
=
1
1− λ
log2

 1
W
∑
(i,j)∈
−→
G
wi,j
[
v−→
G
(i)
W
]λ−1
Taking into account that xλ−1 is decreasing for any 0 ≤ λ < 1 we infer
Hλ(OPT ) ≥
1
1− λ
log2

 1
W
∑
(i,j)∈
−→
G
wi,j
[
max{v(i), v(j)}
W
]λ−1
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The inequality is true for any λ > 1 as well, as xλ−1 is now increasing but
we multiply with negative constant 1
1−λ
.
Let G♭ be a biased orientation. Thus
vG♭(i) =
∑
(i, j) ∈ E
v(i) > v(j)
wi,j.
Let BI = (q♭i )i be its indegree distribution. By the definition of biasedness
we have:
Hλ(OPT ) ≥
1
1− λ
log2

 1
W
∑
(i,j)∈
−→
G
wi,j
[
max{v(i), v(j)}
W
]λ−1
=
1
1− λ
log2

 1
W
∑
(i,j)∈E
wi,j
[
max{v(i), v(j)}
W
]λ−1
=
1
1− λ
log2

 1
W
∑
(i,j)∈G♭
wi,j
[
v(i)
W
]λ−1
=
1
1− λ
log2
(∑
i∈V
vG♭(i)
W
[
v(i)
W
]λ−1)
=
=
1
1− λ
log2
(∑
i∈V
q♭i
[
v(i)
W
]λ−1)
Deng and Papadimitriou [DP94] proved that the Shapley value of an
induced subgraph game is s(i) = 1
2
∑
i 6=j wi,j =
v(i)
2
. Thus, the Shapley dis-
tribution Sh = (si)i of such a game is si =
v(i)
2W
= s(i)
W
.
Hence:
Hλ(OPT ) ≥
1
1− λ
log2
(∑
i∈V
q♭i
[
2W · si
W
]λ−1)
=
1
1− λ
log2
(∑
i∈V
q♭i (si)
λ−1
)
− 1
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The difference between entropies of the optimal and Shapley distribution
can be written as follows:
Hλ(q)−Hλ(s) ≥
1
1− λ
log2
(∑
i∈V
q♭i (si)
λ−1
)
− 1−
1
1− λ
log2
(∑
i∈V
sλi
)
=
[
1
1− λ
log2
∑
i∈V
q♭i (si)
λ−1 +
1
λ
log2
∑
i∈V
sλi −
1
λ(1− λ)
log2
∑
i∈V
(
q♭i
)λ]
+
1
λ(1− λ)
log2
∑
i∈V
(
q♭i
)λ
−
1
λ
log2
∑
i∈V
sλi −
1
1− λ
log2
∑
i∈V
sλi − 1
= hλ[BI, Sh] +
1
λ
Hλ(BI)−
1
λ
Hλ(Sh)− 1
Applying the discrete Gibbs Lemma we infer
Hλ(q)−Hλ(Sh) ≥
1
λ
(Hλ(BI)−Hλ(Sh))− 1
which is what we had to prove, up to multiplication with -1.
Conclusions
The main contribution of this paper was to propose a parametric family of
measures of worst-case fairness in cooperative settings. Besides the analogy
with the Cowell-Kuga measures of inequality, a partial possible justification
of the parametric nature of our family arises from Corollary 2: depending on
the particular values of λ different approximation algorithms may provides
the better approximation.
Our analysis raises many open questions:
• Prove that maximizing marginalist worst-case fairness of IS games is
NP-complete. We attempted to adapt the approach of [CFJ08b] to
yield graphs G that are regular (and thus the Shapley value of the
IS game on G coincides with the uniform distribution). However the
reduction from [CFJ08b] seems to produce graphs that are inherently
non-regular (more precisely, they have vertices with two possible de-
grees, 3 and 4). Further attempts at modifying the gadgets employed
in this construction were unsuccessful. Nevertheless, we believe that
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maximizing marginalist worst-case fairness of IS games is NP-complete
as well.
• Investigate the tightness of the upper bounds for approximating marginal-
istic and other worst-case fairness measures in the case of IS games.
Our result showed that an additive upper bound could be obtained at
least for marginalist worst-case fairness. We don’t have, however, any
results concerning the hardness of approximation for this measure.
• Extend the study of these measures to other convex cooperative games.
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Appendix:
Proof of Lemma 2
We will apply the classical Ho˝lder inequality:
∑
i
figi ≤
(∑
i
f ti
) 1
t
(∑
i
gri
) 1
r
where (fk)k, (gk)k ∈ R+, and t, r > 1 with 1/t + 1/r = 1. There are two
cases:
Case λ > 1 : Setting t = λ > 1, r = λ
λ−1
, fi = pi, gi = q
λ−1
i we obtain:
∑
i∈V
qλ−1i pi ≤
(∑
i∈V
pλi
) 1
λ
(∑
i∈V
(
qλ−1i
) λ
λ−1
)λ−1
λ
Further, taking the logarithm and dividing with the negative number 1−λ
we get:
1
1− λ
log
(∑
i∈V
qλ−1i pi
)
≥
1
1− λ
log


(∑
i∈V
pλi
) 1
λ
(∑
i∈V
qλi
)λ−1
λ


=
1
λ(1− λ)
log
∑
i∈V
pλi −
1
λ
log
(∑
i∈V
qλi
)
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Case 0 < λ < 1 : We now take t = 1
λ
> 1, r = 1
1−λ
> 1,fi =
(
qλ−1i pi
)λ
and gi = q
λ(1−λ)
i , therefore:
∑
i∈V
pλi =
∑
i∈V
(
qλ−1i pi
)λ
q
λ(1−λ)
i
≤
[∑
i∈V
((
qλ−1i pi
)λ) 1λ]λ [∑
i∈V
(
q
λ(1−λ)
i
) 1
1−λ
]1−λ
=
[∑
i∈V
qλ−1i pi
]λ [∑
i∈V
qλi
]1−λ
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equivalently
∑
i∈V
qλ−1i pi ≥
(∑
i∈V
pλi
) 1
λ
(∑
i∈V
qλi
)λ−1
λ
Taking the logarithm and dividing by 1−λ we obtain the inequality. The
result can be extended to case λ = 1 as well by taking the limit.
Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. From the definition we have
Dλ(P ‖ R)−Dλ(Q ‖ R) =
=
1
λ− 1
log2
(∑
i∈V
pλi (ri)
1−λ
)
−
1
λ− 1
log2
(∑
i∈V
qλi (ri)
1−λ
)
We will reason separately in cases 0 < λ < 1 and λ > 1. The result
will however be the same because function x1−λ is increasing in the first case
(decreasing in the second) while λ− 1 is negative (positive).
Using inequality rmin ≤ ri ≤ rmax we infer
1
λ− 1
log
(∑
i∈V
pλi (rmax)
1−λ
)
≤ Dλ(P ‖ R) ≤
1
λ− 1
log
(∑
i∈V
pλi (rmin)
1−λ
)
therefore:
Dλ(P ‖ R)−Dλ(Q ‖ R) ≥
≥
1
λ− 1
log
(∑
i∈V
pλi (rmax)
1−λ
)
−
1
λ− 1
log
(∑
i∈V
qλi (rmin)
1−λ
)
=
1
λ− 1
log
(
(rmax)
1−λ
∑
i∈V
pλi
)
−
1
λ− 1
log
(
(rmin)
1−λ
∑
i∈V
qλi
)
= − log
(
rmax
)
−
1
1− λ
log
(∑
i∈V
pλi
)
+ log
(
rmin
)
+
1
1− λ
log
(∑
i∈V
qλi
)
= Hλ(Q)−Hλ(P )− nu(R)
The other inequality is proved similarly.
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Proof of Theorem 2
The problem is easily seen to be interreducible to problem MREIS: We have
Fairλ(Γ, U) ≥ η if and only if there exists a cover x of Γ, seen as an instance
of MREIS such that Hλ(x) ≤ log2(n) − η. Therefore it is enough to prove
that for any λ > 0 problem MREIS is NP-complete.
Next, Lemma 4 interreduces in effect problems MREWO and MREIS.
For λ = 1 problem MREWO has been proved to be NP-complete [CFJ08b],
even in the unweighted version (we = 1 for all e ∈ E(G)).
The proof of this result encodes an instance Φ of an NP-complete version
of 1-in-k SAT into a graph G = (V,E) and an orientation
−→
G of whose in-
degree distribution dominates all other probability distributions arising from
edge orientations of G. We may read the existence of a satisfying assignment
for Φ from the entropy of orientation
−→
G .
The proof can be easily adapted to the general case λ > 0 by using Lemma
1 which is the generalization of the result employed in [CFJ08b] to all values
λ > 0. The basis is the following modification of Claim 2 in [CFJ08b], with
essentially the same proof as the original version.
Lemma 8. For any λ > 0, λ 6= 1, the Re´nyi entropy of the distribution
corresponding to orientation
−→
G (constructed in [CFJ08b]) is at most
log2m−
1
1− λ
log2
(
4λ + 7 · 3λ−1 + 1
)
/12
with equality if and only if instance Φ is satisfiable.
The conclusion of this argument is that computing lower bounds on
Fairλ(Γ, U) is NP-complete (the fact that they the problem is in NP is
trivial).
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